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Abstract 
It is a textbook truism that many corporate relationships among governance agents could be theoretically informed by the 
established agency paradigm. The economic based principal-agent theorization is however falling short of allowing researchers to 
evaluate the quality of such relationships. In this paper, we depart from the mainstream principal-agent theoretical argumentation 
by attending to “Leader-Member Exchange” theory (LMX theory), a commonly applied theorization in organizational 
psychology and communication management literature repertoire. We delineate relevant governance relationships among various 
governance agents across contexts and subsequently, theoretically argue the applicability of LMX theory in explaining their 
dyadic relationships. Interfacing LMX theory with corporate governance, we further provide the necessary instruments for 
measuring governance agents’ relationships quality. Despite the theoretical and argumentative nature of our research endeavour, 
this paper presents a novel attempt to theoretically demonstrate in light of the subtlety in governance scholarship with respect to 
the quality of corporate relationships prevailing in any established governance arrangements, that the LMX theory provides an 
applicable and useful framework through which the dynamics of corporate relationships within the context of corporate 
governance could be appropriately analyzed and evaluated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Governance studies examining corporate relationships among governance agents and its implications on 
organizational goals were generally grounded on the established agency framework (see Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). While such economic based principal-agent theorization managed to theoretically inform the nature of 
considered corporate relationships, it however falls short of allowing researchers to evaluate the quality of such 
relationships (see Christopher (2010) for a critical discussion on this issue). This is also in contrast to the fact that 
calls have been made by promulgators to emphasize on the quality of relationship between governance actors 
particularly between audit committee and internal as well as external auditors to ensure good corporate governance 
(see MCCG 2007). Extant studies on relationship between corporate governance actors mostly examine only factors 
surrounding the frequency of interaction between them rather than the goodness of their relationship. An obvious 
example is a study by Zaman and Sarens (2013) on audit committee-internal auditor relationship used the existence 
of informal interaction (yes = 1 and no = 0) and the frequency of formal meeting as the measure of the extent of 
relationship even though to delve the relationship quality between the two governance mechanisms might offer 
deeper understanding.  
Frequency of interaction, number of meeting specifically, may not reflect conducive or good relationship as there 
is evidence that governance agents meets regularly not because they trust or work well with each other but because 
of complying with norms and corporate governance standard such as Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (see 
Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). Another one is by Lee (2003) who measured the extent of audit committee-
external auditor relationship using the tenure of the auditor service even though the tenure reflect number of years 
rather than the goodness of the relationship between the two parties. In light of such subtlety in the governance 
scholarship, we attend to “Leader-Member Exchange” theory (LMX theory), commonly applied in organizational 
psychology and communication management literature.  
Accordingly, our theoretical endeavours in this paper are twofold. First, we aim at theorizing the meaning of 
quality corporate relationships prevailing in any governance arrangements by introducing appropriate instruments 
for the quality measure based on the LMX approach. Second, we aim at suggesting potential domain of relationships 
among various governance agents for future applied qualitative governance research. The relevance of LMX theory 
in explaining various corporate relationships in the corporate governance domain is primarily premised on the fact 
that governance effectiveness essentially requires quality leaderships (Davies, 2006). As leaders in any governance 
arrangement inevitably develop relationships with other governance agent(s) (termed “followers” in the LMX 
context), the LMX theory elucidates how such relationships are cultivating uniquely. It further provides the 
necessary instruments based on specific relationship constructs, through which the quality of such developed 
relationships could be evaluated. Arguably, these are contributive to the governance scholarship as it systematically 
enriches the governance literature repertoire. 
We consider our theorizing initiative as important due to both (1) the untapped governance literature gap to 
appropriately guide the empirical practice; and (2) the potential problem(s) in the empirical governance and 
leadership practices emanating from the unavailability of relevant literature to accordingly guide its practices. With 
regards to the former, extant governance literature highlights two important points. First, there exists single lens of 
agency, through which the nature of corporate relationships prevailing in governance arrangements could be 
understood. Second, based on such single view of principal-agent paradigm, prior empirical endeavours have 
extensively concentrated on the exercises of establishing statistical relationship between various governance agents 
in any corporate relationships (e.g. see Cohen et al., 2004; Denis, 2001). These represent an observable gap in the 
literature as extant studies provide little (if not none) knowledge on the method of explaining and measuring the 
quality of such established corporate relationships among various governance agents, reinforcing the first point with 
respect to the importance of our theorizing initiative.  
The unaddressed literature gap to guide the empirical practice discussed above suggests the over reliance of prior 
empirical corporate relationships studies in governance domain on a single view of agency theorization. This 
potentially hinders innovative designing of effective governance arrangement, as the knowledge frontiers informing 
the nature and extent of quality corporate relationship critical to the designing of appropriate governance structure is 
shadowed by the use of single theoretical view. We consider understanding relationship quality among governance 
agents as imperative due to at least two specific reasons. First, in the context of governance contracting exercises, 
quality relationships determines the effectiveness of designed governance structures (Daily, McDougall, Covin et 
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al., 2002), which itself is inextricably linked to the achievement of organizational goals and performance (e.g. 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2007).  
Second, effective interactions among governance players primarily ensures the effective functioning of many 
governance devices (Cohen et al., 2004) including among others, independent directors, internal and external 
auditing and audit committees. Accordingly, we contribute to both, the literature and practices of governance and 
leadership in at least two specific ways. First, we enrich the extant governance and leadership knowledge with 
respect to the methodological framework of understanding and measuring the quality of relationships among 
governance agents by applying an alternative theoretical paradigm of LMX theory. Second, we identify and suggest 
potential domain of relationships in governance context suitable for the application of LMX theorizing initiative for 
future applied empirical research.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section explains the LMX theory, segregating into five sub-
sections, attempting to put the discussion into its proper context (sections 2.1 to 2.6). This is followed by section 3 
which presents the potential domain of relationships among governance agents potentially applicable to the 
utilization of LMX theory. Section 4 concludes this theoretical paper. 
 
2. Understanding Leader-Member Exchange Theory (LMX Theory) 
 
2.1 Background: The LMX Theory, Relationship and Leadership 
 
The LMX theory is a relationship centered theory of leadership (Dansereau, Graen and Haga, 1975). The 
theorization is based on the vertical dyad linkages (or relationships) between leader and follower(s) which argued to 
take place on a dyadic basis. Follower or member is a subordinate and leader is an immediate superior who the 
follower has to formally report to; in addition the theorists advocated that LMX theory can also explain workplace 
peer relationships (Osman, Van Peursem & Eggleton, 2008). The theory claims that leadership process effectively 
involves series of tacit exchange agreements with varying quality dimensions (i.e. high or low). It considers each 
individual leader and followers as having unique attributes, causing them to work differently in different situations 
(Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). However, given the presence of situational factors (e.g. limited time and resources) 
constraining leaders and their leadership practices, leaders are also envisaged to discriminately interact with 
subordinates causing different treatments given to different group members throughout the leadership processes 
(Duchon, Green and Taber, 1986).  
Accordingly, the theory dictates that effective leadership process is conditional upon the development of mature 
relationships between leader and followers (Dockery and Steiner, 1990). Such mature relationship is expected to 
develop in the environment requiring an appreciation for the personal values of group member(s) agreeing to 
contribute their energy and talents in accomplishing predetermined organizational targets (Burns and Otte, 1999; 
Phillips and Bedeian, 1994). Mature relationship is systematically shaped by both, characteristics and behaviors of 
both leaders and members based on three factors of (1) respect; (2) trust; and (3) mutual obligation (Graen and Uhl-
Bien, 1995). Therefore, matured relationships are expected to be appropriately developed when there exist (1) 
mutual respect for the capabilities of others; (2) the anticipation of deepening reciprocal trust; and (3) the 
expectation that interacting obligation will grow and strengthen over time (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). 
 
2.2 Followers’ Classifications and Its Characteristics  
 
The conceptualization of leadership in LMX theory as a process centred on interactions between leaders and 
followers necessitates the dyadic relationship to become the focal point in leadership process (Graen and Cashman, 
1975). Common relationship interactions between leader and members in any leadership settings suggest that offers 
to form relationships are normally initiated by leaders rather than followers (Hoye, 2006). The LMX theory’s 
rejection of homogenous leadership style predominant in other leadership models effectively resulted in the 
formation of two groups of followers termed as “in-group” and “out-group” (Dockery and Steiner, 1990; Graen and 
Uhl-Bien, 1995).  
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Such classification is provided in the literature to have been based on at least four factors of (1) leader-followers 
workings relationships; (2) leader’s and followers’ personalities; (3) followers’ assumed role responsibilities; and 
(4) followers’ competencies and accomplishments (see Hoye, 2004). In-group followers are normally created soon 
after they accepted offers to develop a mature dyadic relationship with leader (Dockery and Steiner, 1990). Consists 
of individuals possessing high quality exchange relationship with leader, they hold specific observable 
characteristics including (1) trusted inner circle whom work harder and are more committed to achieving task 
objectives; (2) individuals volunteering for additional works beyond the delegated job assignments (including 
unstructured tasks); and (3) group members displaying high levels of commitment and loyalty to leader (Graen and 
Scandura, 1987; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995).  
In response to in-group followers’ positive attitudes and contributive efforts, leaders subsequently exchange 
personal and positional resources (Duchon et al., 1986). These include (1) offering them additional support; (2) 
giving high levels of responsibility and hence greater opportunity for career advancement; (3) granting strategic 
decision influence; (4) providing greater access to resources; and (5) consider them at first place for rewards and 
recognition (Graen and Scandura, 1987; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). These are premised on the fact that leaders are 
more predisposed to commit higher level of social exchange with followers whom are able to offer them more in 
terms of abilities, availability and willingness to contribute to delegated job tasks (Hoye, 2006; Kim and Organ, 
1982). These counter exchange tendency is central to LMX theory which collectively motivate followers to perform 
even better consistently throughout the employment period. 
In contrast, subordinates who reject leader’s offers of developing a mature dyadic relationship will subsequently 
place themselves in an out-group (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). They possess common characteristics of (1) 
(normally) new entrants to an organization; (2) perform only in accordance with the prescribed employment contract 
and achieved the minimum goals whilst never attempt to achieve more; and (3) having a more formal relationship 
with leader throughout the employment contract (Graen, Hui and Taylor, 2004; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). 
Similarly, leader will respond to out-group members by providing limited reciprocal trust, support, attention and 
rewards (Hoye, 2006; Kim and Organ, 1982). These would potentially, adversely influence organizational 
performance as it systematically ignores strategic and innovative ideas or knowledge of out-group followers which 
are unable to be shared given the low levels of choice or influence imposed on them.  
 
2.3 Dimensions of Relationship Construct  
The LMX literature suggests three dimensions of leader-member relationship construct namely (1) respect; (2) 
trust; and (3) obligation, effectively means that the extent of leader-member(s) relationship quality becomes the 
functions of mutual trust, respect and obligation between both parties (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). Extant literature 
further indicates that high mutual trust, respect and obligation would lead leader-member interaction to transcend 
“beyond mechanical compliance” (Uhl-Bien, Graen and Scandura, 2000, p.153) and “employment contract” 
(Settoon, Bennet and Liden, 1996, p.220), whereby both parties reciprocally assisting and protecting each other 
(Graen and Scandura, 1987; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Uhl-Bien et al., 2000; Wayne, Shore and Liden, 1997). On 
the contrary, low mutual trust, respect and obligation between leader and member(s) would lead to member(s) 
focusing only on complying with formal job prescriptions (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000) and leader(s) acting only 
according to their job authority (Graen and Scandura, 1987). 
In the context of leader-member relationship, Uhl-Bien et al. (2000) argues that “respect’ exist when one party 
has high regards towards other’s workplace capabilities, conditional upon various factors. For instance, leader’s 
respect towards his/her followers is conditional upon followers’ ability to demonstrate workplace capabilities and 
accordingly, maintaining leader’s corporate/leadership standing. Leader would on the other hand, be respected if 
he/she is highly capable of managing his or her leadership roles within the organization (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000). 
Discussions on “trust” dimension in the LMX literature generally concentrate on three intermingling concepts of (1) 
betrayal/manipulation; (2) dependency; and (3) principles-sharing. According to Uhl-Bien et al. (2000), trust exist 
when one party to the relationship believes that he/she will not be betrayed and his/her weaknesses will not be used 
as reason(s) for manipulation by the other party. Trust will be further strengthened as the absence of 
betrayal/manipulation systematically induces one party to believe that the other can be depended upon and thereby 
believes that they share common “set of principles” in their relationship. 
The LMX literature indicates close connectedness of obligation dimension with the way leader and member(s) 
exchanging favors among them (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000). High mutual obligation in leader-member relationship is 
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characterized with favors being granted without any formal request (or instruction) as well as consideration of 
reward or payback. In contrast, low mutual obligation is exemplified with the granting of favor only upon request, 
and the expectation of instant payback (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000). Even though the LMX literature spells that 
relationship quality contains three dimensions (which are mutual respect, trust and obligation) it should be seen as 
one construct rather than distinct factors, and it is at best should be measured using unidimensional instrument 
which is called LMX-7 (Graen, 2005; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). The validity and reliability of this instrument have 
been justified by several empirical tests (e.g., Schyns & Paul, 2005). 
 
2.4 The LMX Process 
The LMX literature [particularly Graen and Scandura (1987)], provides three stages encapsulating the process of 
relationships building between leader and follower(s), during which the mature relationship is developed and the 
“in-group” and “out-group” member(s) are created. The first stage of “role taking” is during which leader offers 
group members the opportunities to demonstrate self-capabilities subsequent to their admission into the group. This 
provides avenue through which followers’ abilities and talents could be assessed. Simultaneously, both parties 
would also attempt to ascertain the manner in which they like to be respected. The second phase termed as “role 
making” involves unofficial negotiations between leader and member(s) the results of which a role is created for 
member(s) and the implied promises of rewards in terms of benefits and power in return for commitment, 
dedication and loyalty are subsequently offered. This negotiation significantly determines followers’ classification 
(in/out group) with anyone possessing similar characteristics with that of the leader has higher chances of being 
selected as in-group follower(s) (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995).  
The important relationship dimension of trust-building is critical at this juncture as any form of realized betrayal 
towards the leader would provide concrete reason(s) for betrayer(s) to be classified as out-group follower(s) (Graen 
and Scandura, 1987). The third stage of “routinization” entails patterns of ongoing social exchange between leader 
and follower(s) whereby the dividing line in members’ qualities between in-group and out-group is consequently 
drawn, directly revealing the personal qualities of each follower (Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). In-group members 
observably strive at simultaneously building and sustaining both the trust and respect towards the leader. 
Accordingly, they work diligently, highly committed to the given responsibilities and receptive to viewpoint(s) of 
others (particularly those of leader’s). In contrast, out-group followers commonly hold self-centered view(s) while 
at most moderately committed to the job tasks given. 
 
2.5 Factors Affecting Leader-Member Relationship Quality: A Brief Review 
LMX literature provides a number of conceptual models attempting to explain determinants of leader-member 
relationship quality (e.g. Dienesch and Liden, 1986; Graen and Scandura, 1987; Liden, Sparrowe and Wayne, 
19971; Uhl-Bien et al., 20002), with each model generally concentrating on three general factors of (1) 
characteristics of leader and members; (2) both parties’ assessment of, expectations on and reaction to their 
relationship; and (3) the context of their interaction. 
The first, commonly cited factor influencing leader-member relationship quality is the characteristics of both 
leader and members (Dienesch and Liden, 1986; Graen and Scandura, 1987; Liden et al., 1997; Uhl-Bien et al., 
2000) as well as the extent of those characteristics’ compatibility and (a)symmetrical (Liden et al., 1997). Prior 
studies have identified myriad of characteristics related to personal, physical and psychological (e.g. Uhl-Bien et 
al., 2000) specifically on attitudes, appearance, flexibilities, competencies, personality, experience, resourceful, age 
                                                          
1 Factors introduced by Liden et al. (1997) were based on their extensive review of previous conceptual models (e.g. Graen and Scandura, 1987; 
Dienesch and Liden, 1986), seminal LMX articles (e.g. (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1976; Graen & Cashman, 1975)) and previous 
empirical studies (sixteen studies conducted from 1985 to 1997 (e.g., Dockery & Steiner, 1990; Snyder & Brunning, 1985; Wayne, Shore, & 
Liden, 1997) on the determinants of leader-member relationship quality. 
2 Even though introduced much later than the others, this model is comparatively incomprehensive. However, the model is similar with Liden’s 
model in suggesting that leader’s and members’ characteristics may determine leader-member relationship quality.  
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and expertise (e.g. Dienesch and Liden, 1986; Graen and Scandura, 1987; Liden et al., 1997). For instance, a high 
quality relationship was found to be conditional upon leader’s resourcefulness (Graen and Scandura, 1987) as well 
as his/her leadership competencies (Liden et al., 1997) and flexibility (Graen and Scandura, 1987). According to 
Graen and Scandura (1987), leaders with sufficient valuable and necessary resources (e.g. positional, personal, etc.) 
would be in a better position to create quality leader-member relationship as those resources could be utilized to 
motivate members by accordingly rewarding them. 
However, inflexible leaders whom strictly observe highly structured workplace relationship practices by 
systematically de-emphasizing essences of mutual respect, trust, and obligation would provide little incentive for 
members to reciprocally engage in quality relationship. Besides the characteristics, the extent of its compatibility, 
similarity or liking (actual and perceived) further contribute to the formation of a high quality leader-member 
 
2.6 Implications of High Relationship Quality: A Brief Review 
 
In the context of employment, the nature of employees-management interactions effectively shapes workplace 
environments, which consequently affect the working behaviour of both parties. In the specific context of workplace 
leadership, positive working behavior (i.e. quality employees-management relationship) subsequently ensures 
effective leadership which is a pre-requisite for positive organizational outcome. The extant LMX literature 
indicates myriads of positive organizational outcome arising from quality behavioral and emotional exchanges 
between leader and follower(s). It can be summarized into five general themes of (1) satisfaction; (2) turnover; (3) 
performance; (4) loyalty; and (5) commitment (see Winkler, 2009). Specifically, evidence from prior studies 
indicates that quality relationship is linked to increased job satisfaction including satisfaction towards the leader 
(e.g. Liden and Graen, 1980; Duchon et al., 1986), reduced staffs turnover (e.g. Graen, Liden and Hoel, 1982; 
Dansereau et al., 1975; Gerstner and Day, 1997), enhanced organizational performance (e.g. Liden and Graen 1980; 
Settoon et al., 1996; Dunegan, Uhl-Bien and Duchon, 2002); strengthened loyalty (e.g. Scandura and Graen, 1984) 
and higher organizational commitment (e.g. Duchon et al., 1986; Green et al., 1996). 
 
3. LMX Application to Corporate Governance 
As indicated in the introduction section, the aim of this conceptual paper is to suggest the application of LMX 
theory in assessing the relationship quality within the context of corporate governance arrangement. Our research 
endeavor is premised on the fact that corporate governance framework consists of inter-relationships among 
multiple governance agents. As governance effectiveness depends entirely on the extent of agent’s quality 
relationship with one another (Cohen et al., 2004; Rezaee, 2003), assessing their relationship quality provides 
important insights of firm’s current governance practices (i.e. effectiveness) and potentially suggestive of future 
public policy development related to corporate governance. A review of LMX literature suggests that the theory 
appears very versatile (and hence very relevant) as it had been adopted as the theoretical framework in explaining 
and assessing many kind of workplace relationships including superior-subordinate relationship, employer-
employee relationship, and even teacher-students, superior-nurses and coach-player relationship. There are also 
several attempts to apply this theory on the quality of relationship between board chairman and members in not-for-
profit institutions. 
The extensive application of LMX theory in the literature strengthened our stance as the advocator for the 
adoption of this theory to explain and assess the governance in corporate, for-profit entities. Our endeavor can be 
seen as an extension to prior work by Osman et al. (2008) who proposed that this leadership theory could be used in 
studies on the quality of audit committee-internal auditor relationship, as we are here to enhance the scope of the 
application. The following sections further deliberate this issue: 
 
3.1 Corporate Governance and Its Agents 
Corporate governance has a long history in management related disciplines (e.g. finance and accounting) with the 
year 2010 effectively marked its 234th years of evolution. This is based on the publication of the book entitled 
“Wealth of Nations” by Adam Smith in 1776 which core argument is that professional managers could not be 
expected to take care of other people’s money as if of their own, implying the possibility of goals incongruence 
between owners and managers arising from managerial opportunism (Smith, 1776). Such condition is expected in 
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the environment whereby ownership is separated from control which later becomes the hallmark of joint stock 
companies. It produces a condition where the interests of owner(s) and managers often diverge and that there exist 
discretionary power by managers, implying the need for modern corporations to establish effective monitoring 
system to oversee managerial (mis)behaviors (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
mechanism is termed “corporate governance”. 
Governance literature provides myriads of literal definitions to the term “corporate governance” (e.g. Gillan, 
2006; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; MCCG, 2000; Monk and Minow, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Turnbull, 
1997) which effectively circumvent the core theme of corporate control i.e. how firms should be managed and 
controlled in order to achieve pre-determined objectives of positive organizational outcomes. It includes among 
others corporate performance and quality accounting and reporting. An understanding of how corporate governance 
could ensure the achievement of pre-defined objectives effectively requires knowledge of the types and roles of 
various governance agents and the expected interactions among them which is diagrammatically presented in figure 
1 below. It depicts six main governance agents common in any corporate governance arrangement. Agents are 
expected to interact with one another, thereby giving rise to relationship issues which quality could be subjected to 
an objective empirical assessment. 
 
Table 1: Extant of LMX Application 
No. Context Studies 
1 Organizational Psychology & Communication 
management: Evaluating the quality of superior-
subordinate relationships. 
 
Abu-Bakar, Mustaffa and Mohamad (2009); Abu-Bakar, 
Mohamad and Herman (2004); Berneth, Armenakis, Feild et al. 
(2007); Lee (2001); Leow and Khong (2009); May-Chiun, 
Ramayah, and Jerome (2006); May-Chiun, Ramayah and Ernest 
(2009); May-Chiun, Ramayah and Hii (2009); May-Chiun, 
Ramayah and Hii (2010); Sias (2005); Zhang, Wang and Shi 
(2012) 
2 Sports: Evaluating the quality of coach-player 
relationships. 
Cranmer and Myers (2014); Case (1998); Breukelen, Leeden, 
Wesselius et al. (2012) 
3 Education: Evaluating teacher-students relationship 
quality 
Horan, Chory, Carton, Miller and Raposo (2013); Power (2013) 
4 Nursing: Assessing superior-nurse relationship quality Han and Jekel (2011); Walumbwa, Cropanzano and Goldman 
(2011) 
5 Equal Employment Opportunity: Evaluating the quality 
of employer-women employee relationships. 
Makela (2005) 
6 Governance: Evaluating the quality of relationship 
among selected governance agents in non-profit 
organizations. 
Hoye (2004 and 2006). 
   
 
 
3.2 Domain of Relationships 
The extant of corporate governance literature indicates that positive organizational outcomes are conditional upon 
agents’ relationship quality, thereby potentially suggesting a linear relationship function between the two. In the 
specific case of ensuring firm’s financial reporting quality (FRQ) for instance, effective corporate governance 
demands complex inter-relationships among various governance agents (Cohen et al., 2004; Rezaee, 2003). 
Focusing specifically on corporate governance role of ensuring positive firm’s financial reporting outcome, we 
present below multiple governance relationships which could be theoretically informed by the LMX theory. It 
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primarily provides appropriate explanatory and theoretical framework in any empirical assessments on the 
respective relationship quality. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Chairman3 – Members (Board and Audit Committee (AC) level) 
Board of directors (BOD) is literally defined as “a team of individuals with fiduciary responsibilities” (Abdullah, 
2004 p.47). It is regarded as the most important governance agent in corporate governance system given its strategic 
role in directing firm towards success (or failure) (LeBlanc, 2005). From the financial reporting perspective, board 
members (i.e. directors) are collectively responsible for firm’s financial reporting processes (Goodwin and Seow, 
2002) particularly its accounting disclosure (Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1990). Standing at the apex of 
BOD leadership, chairman plays a significant role in influencing board members’ performance. Chairman is 
expected by almost all established governance codes worldwide to supervise wide arrays of fiduciary (in)actions of 
his board members (see for instance MCCG, 2000). This necessitates board leadership to become a focal point of 
analysis upon examining board effectiveness in the corporate governance context. 
The position of chairman as board leader and his relationship with board members appropriately fit into the 
context for LMX application. Reciprocal dyadic relationships with board members create appropriate context for the 
examination of chairman-directors relationship quality from three important constructs of respect, trust and 
obligations. This is imperative as chairman would normally delegates directorial functions to members as could be 
seen in the context of AC and other sub-committee establishment (e.g. remuneration, nomination, risk management, 
etc). The effective functioning of these sub-committees and hence their performance is inevitably conditional upon 
the extant of chairman-directors quality relationship, which framework of assessment is arguably, readily informed 
by LMX. 
 
                                                          
3 For the sake of simplicity as opposed to exercising gender bias in our analysis, we used the word chairman throughout the 
text. We remain mindful that there are women appointed as company’s head of BOD throughout the world, particularly in the 
case of family firms. 
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3.2.1.1 Board Chairman and Directors Relationship: Examining Multiple Contexts 
The examination of board chairman’s relationship with directors could be further refined by focusing on multiple 
contexts as follows (Figure 2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most commonly studied board characteristic is its leadership structure which could be of two types of either 
unitary or duality. Role duality represents the situation whereby the board chairman also holds the executive 
position of chief executive officers (CEOs); while unitary means that the two positions are split. The former 
indicates both CEO power (Coles and Hesterly, 2000; Daily and Dalton, 1994) and the strength of independent 
directors’ monitoring incentives (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). Given these two leadership styles, analysis on 
chairman’s relationship quality with directors could be done on the basis of his relationship with either executive 
directors, independent non-executive directors or non-independent non-executive directors.  
The analysis on such relationship could potentially yield heterogeneous relationship quality level as different type 
of directors are representing (and hence championing) different economic and social interests in boardroom 
discussions and subsequently boardroom decisions. While INEDs are expected to represent shareholders 
(particularly non-controlling interests), EDs and NINEDs are however expected to protect the interest of controlling 
interest group whom appointed them to board positions. In the specific emerging country like Malaysia where the 
communities are multi-racial and firms are effectively family-owned (Hairul-Suhaimi, Zulkarnain, Shamsher et al.,  
2012), the above multiple relationships could be further examined in different unique contexts, potentially yielding 
even richer empirical results. For instance, the above corporate relationships could be analyzed from the racial lens 
whereby analysis could look at whether is there any differential level of relationship quality between chairman and 
directors of different racial background. The relationship quality could also be assessed in the context of different 
firm’s types of family controlled or highly dispersed ownership. Examining the relationship quality between the 
chairman and these interest groups in different unique contexts identified above would arguably, enable regulators in 
particular, to appropriately design sufficiently balanced board structure and processes which would protect the 
interests of all stakeholders.  
Board Chairman 
Directors’ Types Unique Contexts 
Executive (ED) 
Independent  
Non-Executive 
Non-Independent  
Non-Executive 
Racial 
Bumiputra or 
otherwise 
Ownership 
Family or 
otherwise 
Figure 2  Board Chairman and Directors Relationship 
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3.2.2 Directors (AC level) and Managers relationship. 
With respect to the management, board’s roles include monitoring and advising managers over the 
selection of accounting estimates and compliance to accounting standards and regulations, which tasks are delegated 
to the sub-committee called AC (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault et al., 2002). In this context, academic 
research could examine the relationship quality between AC directors and the management group responsible of 
preparing financial statements. Understanding the relationship quality between these two groups from the specific 
perspectives of respect, trust and mutual obligation would potentially provide insights on the reliability and hence 
the confidence threshold of AC members when reviewing the financial statements. On the other spectrum, it would 
also provide ex-ante expectations over management’s intention and actual compliance towards AC’s directive on 
matters related to financial accounting and reporting. Effectively, these provide strong basis for predicting risks of 
firms producing poor FRQ.  
 
3.2.3 External Auditor and Internal Auditor (IA) relationship 
Prior studies on external auditor relationship with its internal counterpart indicate important reliance of external 
auditor over IA’s performance (e.g. Mat-Zain and Subramaniam, 2007). IA’s credibility influences external 
auditor’s risks threshold and hence, the quantity of audit activities to be undertaken. Accordingly, examining the 
level of respect, trust and mutual obligation among them would potentially provide ex-ante expectation over firm’s 
FRQ as external audit process by external auditors technically involves verifying financial reporting outputs, which 
activities are determined initially by the risk threshold established by external auditors on the basis of their 
assessment towards IA’s credibility. 
 
3.2.4 Audit Committee and External Auditors relationship 
Firm’s financial reporting activities involve extensive interactions between AC and IA (Cohen et al., 2004; 
Zulkarnain, Shamsher and Mohamad-Ali, 2001), which communications include matters relating to internal control 
and other specific financial accounting and reporting related assessments and investigations (e.g. misstatement, 
fraud, etc) (Gramling, Maletta, Schneider et al., 2004). The AC-IA relationship can be categorized as one 
application of leader-member relationship given that AC is an authoritative sub-committee of the board and IA is a 
lower or middle level manager required to report directly to AC (Van-Peursem, 2005). LMX explanation provides 
that a high AC-IA relationship quality would potentially be characterized by a high degree of mutual respect, trust, 
and obligation between these two groups. It also suggests that AC will protect and help IA who in turn becomes 
AC’s reliable assistant (Osman et al., 2008). If the above theoretical propositions hold true, then FRQ is expected to 
be firm’s financial reporting outcome. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The extant of academic literature indicates that various leadership theories have systematically evolved to define 
among others, leadership characteristics, traits and styles. In particular, LMX theory is unique to leadership 
literature repertoire as its approach considers the dyadic relationship of leader and followers and the exchanges that 
affects organizational outcomes including but not limited to corporate innovation, positive job climate, and 
organizational effectiveness. This conceptual paper highlights LMX theory’s value proposition and its relevance in 
the corporate governance context. Focusing specifically on the governance agents’ interactions towards ensuring 
firm’s FRQ, the paper proposes several dimensions of governance relationship worthy of research using the LMX 
instruments which is including relationships between chairman-board members, director-managers, and audit 
committee-external/internal auditor. This expands the corporate governance knowledge frontiers by offering 
relevant instruments to evaluate the relationship quality among various governance agents, a knowledge gap which 
transcends beyond the understanding of the rationale behind such relationship. We consider this theoretical work as 
a contribution to the governance literature as well as input to policy formulation process as such application of LMX 
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is a newly theorized initiative to enable researchers improving their understandings of various important corporate 
relationships. 
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